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Summary _/_S )
The United States' first manned space flight
project was successfully accomplished in a 42_
year period of dynamic activity which saw more
than 2,000,000 people from many major govern-
ment agencies and much of the aerospace in-
dustry combine their skills, initiative, and ex-
perience into a national effort. In this period,
six manned space flights were accomplished as
part of a 25-flight program. These manned
space flights were accomplished with complete
pilot, safety and without change to the basic
Mercury concepts. It was shown that man can
function ably as a pilot-engineer-experimenter
without undesirable reactions or deteriorations
of normal body functions for periods up to 34
hours of weightless flight.
Directing this large and fast moving project
required the development of a management
structure and operating mode that satisfied the
requirement to mold the many different entities
into a workable structure. The management
methods and techniques so developed are dis-
cussed. Other facets of the Mercury experience
such as techniques and philosophies developed
to insure well-trained flight and ground crews
and correctly prepared space vehicles are dis-
cussed. Also, those technical areas of general
application to aerospace activities that pre-
sented obstacles to the accomplishment of the
project are briefly discussed. Emphasis is
placed on 'the n_d for improved detail design
guidelines and philosophy, complete and ap-
propriate hardware qualification programs,
more rigorous standards, accurate and detailed
test procexlures, and more responsive configura-
tion control techniques.
Introduction
The actual beginning of the effort that re-
suited in manned space flight cannot be pin-
pointed although it is known that the thought
has been in the mind of man throughout r_-
corded history. It was only in the last decade,
however, that technology had developed to the
point where man could actually transform his
ideas into hardware to achieve space flight.
Specific studies and tests conducted by govern-
ment and industry culminating in 1958 indi,
cated the feasibility of manned space flight.
Implementation was initiated to establish a na-
tional manned space-flight project, later named
Project Mercury, on October 7, 1958.
The life of Project Mercury was about _%
years, from the time of its official go-ahead to
the completion of the 34-hour orbital mission
of Astronaut Cooper. During this period, much
has been learned about man's capabilities in the
space environment and his capabilities in earth-
bound activities which enabled the successful
accomplishment of the objectives of the Mer-
cury Project in this relatively short period. It
is the purpose of this paper to review the more
significant facets of the project beginning with
the objectives of the project and the guidelines
which were established to govern the activity.
As in any form of human endeavor, there are
certain signs which serve as the outward in-
dication of activity and progress. For the Mer-
cury Project, these signs were the major
full-scale flight tests. These tests will be re-
viewed with particular emphasis on schedule,
the individual mission objectives, and the re-
suits from each mission. Then, the organiza-
tion with which management directed the
1
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19630012072 2020-03-24T05:48:47+00:00Z
activities of Project Mercury will be explained,
particularly with respect to those internal in-
terfaces between major segments of NASA and
those external interfaces with contractors and
other governmental departments. The re-
sources expended during the project will be
explained with discussions On manpower and
cost. In addition, the major results of the
project will be discussed as will those areas
which presented severe obstacles to technical
progress.
This paper is primarily a review; greater
detail in many of the areas discussed can be
obtained by reference to other papers in this
document and to the documents listed in the
bibliography.
Objectives and Guidelines
The objectives of the Mercury Project, as
stated at the time of project go-ahead, were as
follows:
(1) Place a manned spacecraft in orbital
flight around the earth.
(2) Investigate man's performance capa-
bilities and his ability to function in the en-
vironment of space.
(3) Recover the man and the spacecraft
safely.
After the objectives were established for
the project, a number of guidelines were
established to insure that the most expedient
and safest approach for attainment of the ob-
jectives was followed. The basic guide-
lines that were established are as follows:
(1) Existing technology and off-the-shelf
equipment should be used wherever practical.
(2) The simplest and most reliable approach
to system design would be followed.
(3) An existing launch vehicle would be em-
ployed to place the spacecraft into orbit.
(4) A progressive and logical test program
would be conducted.
More detailed requirements for the space-
craft were established as follows:
(1) The spacecraft must be fitted with a reli-
able launch-escape system to separate the space-
craft and its crew from the launch vehicle in case
of impending failure.
(2) The pilot must be given the capability
of manually controlling spacecraft attitude.
(3) The spacecraft must carry a retrorocket
system capable of reliably providing the neces-
sary impulse to bring the spacecraft out of orbit.
(4) A zero-lift body utilizing drag braking
would be used for reentry.
(5) The spacecraft design must satisfy the
requirements for a water landing.
It is obvious by a casual look at the spacecraft
(fig. 1-1) that requirements (1), (3), and (4)
were followed as evidenced by the escape tower,
the retrorocket system that can be seen on the
blunt end of the spacecraft, and the simple
blunt-body shape without wings. Items (2)
and (5) have been made apparent by the man-
ner in which the astronaut has manually con-
trolled the attitude of the spacecra_ during
orbital maneuvers, retrofire, and reentry, and
by the recovery of the spacecraft and astronauts
after each flight by recovery forces which in-
cluded aircraft carriers and destroyers.
Basically, the equipment used in the space-
craft was derived from off-the-shelf equipment
or through the direct application of existing
technology, although some notable exceptions
were made in order to improve reliability and
flight safety. These exceptions include:
(1) An automatic blood-pressure measuring
system for use in flight.
(2) Instruments for sensing the partial pres-
sures of oxygen and carbon dioxide in the oxy-
gen atmosphere of the cabin and suit, respec-
tively.
Some may argue with the detailed way in
which the second basic guideline of simplic-
ity was carried out; however, this guideline
was carried out to the extent possible within the
volume, weight, and redundancy requirements
imposed upon the overall system. The effect of
the weight and volume constraints, of course,
resulted in smaller and lighter equipment that
could not always be packaged in an optimum
way for simplicity.
Redundancy probably increased the complex-
ity of the systems more than any other require-
ment. Because the spacecraft had to be quali-
fied by space flight first, without a man onboard
and then because the reactions of man and his
capabilities in the space environment were un-
known, provisions for a completely automatic
operation of the critical spacecraft functions
were provided. To insure reliable operation,
these automatic systems were backed up by re-
dundant automatic systems.
The third guideline was satisfied by an adap-
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tation of an existing missile, the Atlas. The 
modifications to this launch vehicle for the use 
in the Mercury Project included the addition 
of a means to sense automatically impending 
catastrophic failure of the launch vehicle and 
provisions to accommodate a new structure that 
would form the transition between the upper 
section of the launch vehicle and the spacecraft. 
Also, the pilot-safety pro-pam was initiated to 
insure the selection of quality components. 
Application of the fourth guideline is illus- 
trated by the major flight schedule which is 
discussed in the next section. 
Major Flight Schedules 
Planned Flight Test Schedule 
The Mercury flight schedule that was planned 
early in 1959 is shown in figure 1-2. These are 
the major flight tests and include all those 
scheduled flight tests that involved rocket-pro- 
pelled full-scale spacecraft, including boiler- 
plate and production types. The planned flight 
test program shows 27 major launchings. There 
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are three primary types of tests included in 
these, one type being the research-and-develop- 
ment tests, another being primarily flight- 
qualification of the production spacecraft, and 
the third being the manned orbital flight tests. 
I n  addition, the tests with the Mercury-Red- 
stone launch vehicle provided some early bal- 
listic flights for pilot training. Involved in the 
planned flight-test program were four basic 
types of launch vehicles, the Little Joe, the Mer- 
cury-Redstone, the Mercury-Jupiter, and the 
Mercury -Atlas. 
Four Little Joe flights and two of the Atlas 
powered flights, termed Big Joe, were planned 
to be in the research and development category 
to check the validity of the basic Mercury 
concepts. 
The qualification program was planned to use 
each of the four different launch vehicles. The 
operational concept of the qualification program 
provided for n progressive build-up of flight- 
test system complexity and flight-test condi- 
tions. It was planned that the operation of all 
\ 
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hardware items would be proven in those envi- 
ronments to which they would be subject in both 
normal and emergency conditions associated 
with attainment of the planned mission condi- 
tions. One qualification flight test was planned 
with the use of the Little ,Joe launch vehicle. 
This test was planned to qualify the operation of 
the production spacecraft in a spacecraft-abort 
situation at the combination of dynamic pres- 
sure, Mach number, altitude, and flight-path 
angle that represented the most severe condition 
anticipated for the use of this system during an 
orbital launch. There were eight flight tests 
planned with the use of the Redstone launch ve- 
hicle. The first two were intended to be un- 
manned tests used to qualify the production 
spacecraft and to qualify the production-space- 
craft launch-vehicle combination. The remain- 
ing six Mercury-Redstone flights were to be used 
to train and qualify Mercury astronauts for later 
orbital flights. Two flight tests Kere planned in 
which the .Jupiter launch vehicle was to be used. 
The first one of these was to be made to qualify 
the production spacecraft for those flight condi- 
tions which produced the greatest load factor 
during reentry. The second Jupiter powered 
flight was scheduled as a backup to the first. 
The qualification program for the production 
spacecraft also included plans for three flight 
tests using the Atlas launch vehicle and the re- 
mainder of the flights were expected to be used 
for manned orbital flight if the flight qualifica- 
tion achieved at the time so warranted. 
This flight-test, plan was de,veloped and pro- 
posed in early 1959 as a test plan that repre- 
sented a completely trouble-free preparation 
and flight-test program. According to this 
schedule, the first manned orbital flight could 
have occurred as early as April of 1960. This 
flight-test schedule represents planning that was 
done before experience was gained in the pro- 
duction of spacecraft flight hardware and, 
particularly important, before any experience 
had been gained in the preparation of space 
flight equipment for manned flight. 
The planned flight test schedule (fig. 1-2) 
presents some missions that are shaded. This 
shading indicates that these particular missions 
were eliminated during the course of the pro- 
gram because the requirement either was not 
necessary or was satisfied by some other means. 
I n  addition, it should be noted that the objec- 
tives of some of the other missions were altered 
to fit the situation as the project advanced. 
Actual Flight Test Seheddes 
The 25 major flight tests accomplished during 
the Mercury Project are shown in figure 1-3, in 
the order of their occurrence. Those flight-test 
missions which are marked with solid circles in- 
- 
FIQUBE 1-2.-Planned flight schedule as of January 1959. 
4 
dicate the missions that were added to this
schedule as a result of lessons learned during
some of the preceding flight tests or because of
extensions to the basic mission objectives as in
the case of the last two missions, MA-8 and
MA-9.
Little Joe /.--The flight test program was
initiated with the Little Joe 1 research-and-de-
velopment mission that was scheduled for July
of 1959. The actual launch attempt came in
the following month, on August 21, at the
NASA launch site, Wallops Station, Va. A
nearly catastrophic failure occurred at a time
late in the launch countdown as the vehicle
battery-power supply was being charged. At
this time, the escape-rocket sequence was unin-
tentionally initiated and the spacecraft was sep-
arated from the launch vehicle and propelled
into the air as in a pad-abort sequence. The
escape sequence was accomplished correctly,
though initiated by a fault. The tower was
jettisoned properly, the drogue parachute was
deployed as it should have been, but the main
parachute deployment circuitry was not acti-
vated because of a lack of sufficient electrical
power. The spacecraft was destroyed on impact
with the water. The cause of the failure was
determined by detailed analyses to be a "back-
door" circuit which permitted the launch-escape
system to be activated when a given potential
had been supplied to the battery by ground
charging equipment. The launch vehicle,
though fully loaded with six solid-propellant
rocket motors, was left undamaged on the
launcher.
Big Joe /.--Spacecraft checkout for the
launch of Big Joe 1 was accomplished at the
Cape Canaveral launch site starting in June
of 1959. The primary purpose of the flight was
to investigate the performance of the ablation
heat shield during reentry, as well as to investi-
gate spacecraft reentry dynamics with an in-
strumented boilerplate spacecraft. Other items
that were planned for investigation on this
flight were afterbody heating for both the exit
and reentry phases of flight, drogue and main
parachute deployment, dynamics of the space-
craft system with an automatic control system
in operation, flight loads, and water-landing
loads. Recovery aids, such as SOFAR bombs,
radio beacons, flashing light, and dye markers,
had been incorporated. This spacecraft was
not equipped with an escape system. The mis-
sion was accomplished on September 9, 1959.
Because of the failure of the Atlas booster en-
gines to separate, the planned trajectory was
not followed exactly, but the conditions which
were achieved provided u satisfactory fulfill-
ment of the test objectives. The landing point
of the spacecraft was about 1,300 nautical miles
from the lift-off point, which was about 500
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nautical miles short of the intended landing
point. Even so, the recovery team retrieved the
spacecraft about 7 hours after landing.
Data from instrumentation and results of in-
spection of the spacecraft showed that the heat-
protection method planned for the production
spacecraft was satisfactory for a normal re-
entry from the planned orbit. On the basis
of these results, the backup Big Joe mission
was cancelled.
Little Joe 6.--The Little Joe 6 mission was
successfully accomplished on October 4, 1959,
from the Wallops Station launch site and dem-
onstrated a qualification of the launch vehicle
by successfully flying with staged propulsion
on a trajectory which gave structural and aero-
dynamic loads in excess of those expected to
be encountered on the other planned Little Joe
missions. In addition, a method devised for
correcting the launcher settings for wind ef-
fects, the performance of the booster command
thrust termination system, and the launch oper-
ation were checked out satisfactorily. Two
minor modifications were made to the Little
Joe vehicle as a result of this flight to protect
the second-stage rocket motor and the launch
vehicle base from heat radiated from the thrust-
ing motors.
Little Joe 1A.--Little Joe ]A w_ launched
on November 4, 1959, from the Wallops Station
launch site, as a repeat of the Little Joe 1 mis-
sion. The inflight abort was made, but the
first-order test objective was not accomplished
because of the slow ignition of the escape rocket
motor. This slow ignition delayed spacecraft-
launch-vehicle separation until the vehicle had
passed through the desired test region. All
second-order test objectives were met during
the flight and the spacecraft was successfully
recovered and returned to the launch site. All
other Mercury hardware used in this test, prin-
cipally the major parts of the escape and land-
ing systems, performed satisfactorily.
Little Joe 2.--The Little Joe 9 mission, which
was intended to validate the proper operation
of the spacecraft for a high altitude abort, was
accomplished on December 4, 1959, from the
Wallops Station launch site. The abort se-
quence was initiated at an altitude of almost
100,000 feet and approximated a possible set of
abort conditions that could be encountered dur-
ing a Mercury-Atlas exit flight to orbit. In
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addition to the first-order objectives, the space-
craft reentry dynamics behavior without a con-
trol system was found to be satisfactory. The
spacecraft dynamic stability on descent through
the atmosphere was found to be as expected.
Additional information was obtained on the
operation of the Mercury parachute, the Mer-
cury spacecraft flotation characteristics, and the
operational requirements of spacecraft recov-
ery by surface vessels. A monkey was a pas-
senger on this mission ; both the monkey and the
spacecraft were recovered in satisfactory con-
dition at the end of the mission.
Little Joe lB.--The Little Joe 1B mission was
successfully accomplished on January 21, 1960,
from the Wallops Station launch site. This
mission had been added to the flight schedule
because of the failures of Little Joe 1 and Little
Joe 1A to meet the test objectives. On this mis-
sion, all test objectives were successfully met,
with the accomplishment of an abort at the con-
ditions described for Little Joe 1A. This space-
craft also had a monkey as a passenger. Both
the monkey and the spacecraft were recovered
satisfactorily at the end of the mission.
Beach Abort /.--Mission Beach Abort 1
(BA-1) was accomplished on May 9, 1960, from
the Wallops Station launch site and marked the
first time that a production spacecraft under-
went a major qualification flight test. Produc-
tion spacecraft 1 was a reasonably complete
spacecraft and contained many systems that
later spacecraft would be equipped with. It
was launched on an abort sequence from a
launcher on the ground. The escape-rocket
motor provided the impulse as it would on an
escape from a launch vehicle while still on the
pad. The test was successful and the feasibil-
ity of an abort from a pad was adequately dem-
onstrated. Though the mission was successful,
certain modifications to spacecraft equipment
were found to be desirable after the perform-
ance of these systems was analyzed. Although
separation of the escape tower was accom-
plished, it was not considered satisfactory be-
cause of the small separation distance provided.
This resulted in the redesign of the escape-sys-
tem jettison rocket-motor nozzles. The single
nozzle was replaced by a tri-nozzle assembly to
prevent rocket-motor performance loss by im-
pingement of the exhaust plumes on the escape-
tower structure. This modification proved to
be satisfactoryand wasretainedfor the re-
mainderof the Mercury program. Another
anomaly was the poor performance of the space-
craft telemetry transmitters. Investigation
showed that the cause of this poor performance
was a reversal of the cabling of the transmitter
systems ; thus, for the first time in the program,
inadvertent cross connection of connectors had
been deleted.
Mervury-Atlas /.--The Mercury-Atlas 1
(MA-1) vehicle was launched from the Cape
Canaveral test site on July 29, 1960. The pri-
mary purpose of the MA-1 flight was to test
the structural integrity of a production Mer-
cury spacecraft and its heat-protection elements
during reentry from an exit abort condition
that would provide the maximum heating rate
on the afterbody of the spacecraft. The space-
craft involved was production item 4 and was
equipped with only those systems which were
necessary for the mission. An escape system
was not provided for this spacecraft. The mis-
sion failed about 60 seconds after lift-off. The
spacecraft and launch vehicle impacted in the
water east of the launch complex. Because of
this failure, an intensive investigation into the
probable causes was undertaken. As a result
of this investigation modifications were made
to the interface area between the launch vehicle
and the spacecraft to increase the structural
stiffness. This inflight failure and subsequent
intensive investigation resulted in a consider-
able delay in the launch schedule and the next
Mercury-Atlas launch was not accomplished
until almost 7 months later.
Little Joe 5.--The Little Joe 5 vehicle was
launched on November 8, 1960, from the Wal-
lops Station launch site. The test was intended
to qualify a production spacecraft. It was a
complete specification spacecraft at that time
with the following exceptions: the landing-bag
system was not incorporated; the attitude sta-
bilization and control system was not fully op-
erational, but was installed and used water to
simulate the control system fuel; and certain
components of the communications system not
essential to the mission were omitted. The mis-
sion failed during flight when the escape-rocket
motor was ignited before the spacecraft was
released from the launch vehicle. The space-
craft remained attached to the launch vehicle
until impact and was destroyed. The exact
cause of the failure could not be determined be-
cause of the condition of the spacecraft com-
ponents when recovered from the ocean floor and
because of the lack of detailed flight measure-
ments. The results of the analyses attributed
the failure to components of the sequential sys-
tem, but the cause could not be isolated. The
sequential systems of spacecraft 2 and 6 were
modified to preclude the possibility of a single
erroneous signal igniting the escape-rocket
motor.
Mercury-Redstone I and 1A.--The Mercury-
Redstone 1 (M'R-1), which was to provide
qualification of a nearly complete production
spacecraft number 2, in flight with a Mercury-
Redstone launch vehicle, was attempted on
November 21, 1960, at the Cape Canaveral
launch site. The mission was not successful.
At lift-off, the launch-vehicle engine was shut
down and the launch vehicle settled back on the
launcher after vertical motion of only a few
inches. The spacecraft also received the shut-
down signal and its systems reacted accordingly.
The escape-rocket system was jettisoned and the
entire spacecraft landing system operated as it
had been designed. Analyses of the cause of
malfunction showed the problem to have been
caused by failure of two ground umbilicals to
separate from the launch vehicle in the proper
sequence. In the wrong sequence, one umbilical
provided an electrical path from launch-vehicle
power through blockhouse ground and the
launch-vehicle engine cut-off relay coil to
launch-vehicle ground that initiated the cut-off
signal. Except for loss of expendable items on
the spacecraft, such as the escape system and the
parachutes and the peroxide, the spacecraft was
in flight condition. The launch vehicle was
slightly damaged in the aft section by recontact
with the launcher The spacecraft and launch
vehicle were demated. The launch vehicle was
replaced by another Mercury-Redstone launch
vehicle, and the spacecraft was again prepared
for its mission. Modifications included a long
ground strap that was placed between the launch
vehicle and the launcher to maintain electrical
ground until umbilicals had been separated.
The refurbished spacecraft and new Mercury-
Redstone launch vehicle were launched success-
fully as mission MR-1A on December 19, 1960.
At this time, all test objectives were met. All
major spacecraft systems performed well
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throughoutheflight. Thelaunch-vehicleper-
formancewasnormalexceptfor ahigherthan
nominalcut-offvelocity. The only effectsof
this anomalywere,to increasetlle range,maxi-
mumaltitude,andmaximumaccelerationdur-
ing reentry. Thespacecraftwaspickedupby
a helicopter15minutesafter landingandwas
deliveredbacktothelaunchsiteonthemorning
afterthelaunch.
Mercury-Redstone 2.--The MR-2 mission
was accomplished on January 31, 1961, from the
Cape Canaveral test site with a chimpanzee ms
a passenger. Production spacecraft 5 was
used. The mission was successful and the ma-
jority of the test objectives were met. Analyses
of launch-vehicle data obtained during the
flight revealed that launch-vehicle propellant
depletion occurred before the velocity cut-off
system was armed and before the thrust cham-
ber abort switch was disarmed. This combina-
tion of events resulted in an abort signal being
transmitted to the spacecraft from the launch
vehicle. The spacecraft reacted correctly to
the abort signal and an abort sequence was
properly made. The greater than normal
launch-vehicle velocity combined with the ve-
locity increment obtained unexpectedly from
the escape-rocket motor produced a flight path
that resulted in a landing point about 110 nau-
tical miles farther downrange than the planned
landing point. This extra range, of course, was
the prime factor in the 2 hours and 56 minutes
that it took to locate and recover the spacecraft.
The chimpanzee was recovered in good condi-
tion, even though the flight had been more se-
vere than planned. By the time the spacecraft
was recovered, it had nearly filled with water.
Some small holes had been punctured in the
lower pressure bulkhead at landing. Also, the
heat-shield retaining system was fatigned by
the action of the water and resulted in loss of
the heat shield. Another anomaly that oc-
curred during the flight was the opening of the
spacecraft cabin inflow valve during ascent,
which prevented the environmental control sys-
tem from maintaining pressure at the design
level. Because the pressure dropped below the
desig'n level, the emergency environmental sys-
tem was exercised, and it performed satisfac-
torily. From the experiences of this flight, a
number of modifications were made to the
spacecraft systems to avoid recurrence of the
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malfunctioning items. These modifications in-
cluded the following:
(1) An additional fiber glass bulkhead was
installed between the heat shield and the large
pressure bulkhead to protect the bulkhead dur-
ing landing, and items in the large pressure
bulkhead area that could be driven "dagger-
like" through the larger pressure bulkhead dur-
ing the landing were removed or reoriented.
('2) The heat-shield retention system was im-
proved with the addition of a number of cables
and cable-retention devices. The modified heat-
shield retention system was proved to be capable
of retaining the heat shield to the spacecraft in
rough seas for periods of up to 10 hours.
(3) Tolerances of the inflow valve detent sys-
tem were changed to assure positive retention
during periods of vibration.
Mercury-Atlas 2._The Mercury-Atlas 2 ve-
hicle was launched from the Cape Canaveral
test site on February '21, 1961, to accomplish the
objectives of the MA-1 mission. The space ve-
hicle for this flight consisted of the sixth pro-
duction spacecraft and Atlas launch vehicle No.
67-D. Several structural changes made in the
spaceci,_ft launch-vehicle interface area as a
result of the failure of the preceding Mercury-
Atlas missions were as follows :
(!) The adapter was stiffened.
(2) The clearance between the spacecraft
retropackage and the launch-vehicle lox tank
dome was increased.
(3) An 8-inch-wide stainless-steel band was
fitted circumferentially around the upper end of
the launch-vehicle lox tank.
(4) The lox-valve support structure was
changed so that the valve was not attached to
the adapter.
(5) Special instrumentation was installed in
the spacecraft launch-vehicle interface area to
measure loads, vibrations, and pressures.
The major test objective of the MA-2 mission
was to demonstrate the integrity of the space-
craft structure, ablation shield, and afterbody
shingles for the most severe reentry from the
standpoint of load factor and afterbody tem-
perature. The fligh_ closely matched the de-
sired trajectory, and the desired temperature
and loading measurements were obtained. The
spacecraft landed in the planned landing area
and was recovered and placed aboard a recovery
ship approximately 55 minutes after it was
launched.A preliminaryevaluationof meas-
ureddataanda detailed inspection of the re-
covered spacecraft indicated that, all test objec-
tives were satisfied and that the spacecraft
structure and heat-protection elements were in
excellent condition.
Little Joe 5A.--The Little Joe 5A mission
was accomplished on March 18, 1961, from the
Wallops Station launch site. This was an
added mission, as a result of the failure of the
Little Joe 5. For the Little Joe 5A mission,
production spacecraft 14 and the sixth Little
Joe launch vehicle to be flown were used. The
spacecraft was a basic Mercury configuration
with only those systems installed that were re-
quired for the mission. As during the Little
Joe 5 mission early ignition of the escape-rocket
motor occurred. The mission was unsuccessful.
However, unlike the Little Joe 5 mission, a
backup spacecraft separation system was initi-
ated by ground command and sucz_essfully
separated the spacecraft from the launch vehicle
and released the tower. Because of the severe
flight conditions existing at the time of para-
chute arming, both main and reserve parachutes
were deployed simultaneously. They filled and
enabled the spacecraft to make a safe land-
ing. All other active systems operated prop-
erly except that the cabin pressure-relief valve
failed to maintain the spacecraft cabin pressure
because of a piece of safety wire found lodged in
the seat. The spacecraft was recovered and re-
turned to the launch area in good condition.
Analysis of data from the spacecraft proved
that the early ignition of the escape rocket motor
was caused by structural deformation in the
spacecraft-adapter interface area. This early
ignition permitted separation sensing switches
to falsely sense movement and give the signal
for the remainder of the sequence. The cor-
rections applied were to reduce air loading in
the area by b_ter fairing of the clamp-ring
cover, by increasing the stiffness of the switch
mounting and reference structures, and rerout-
ing the electrical signals from these switches
through a permissive network.
Mercury-Redstone-Booster Development.--
The Mercury-Redstone-Booster Development
(MR-BD) mission was made on March 24, 1961,
from the Cape Canaveral launch site, with a
Mercury-Redstone launch vehicle and the re-
furbished and ballasted Little Joe 1A research-
and-development spacecraft. This flight was
made as the result of the analyses of the per-
formance of the launch vehicles on the Mercury-
Redstone 1A and Mercury-Redstone 2 flights,
which showed that there were some launch-
vehicle problems that required correction and
requalification. Most of these problems had to
do with the overspeed performance that was at-
tained during those missions. The flight was
successful and analyses of the launch-vehicle
data indicated that the launch-vehicle correc-
tions were entirely satisfactory. No recovery
of the spacecraft was attempted since it was
used only as a payload of the proper size, shape,
and weight, and no provisions were made to
separate it from the launch vehicle during the
mission.
Mercury-Atlas 3.--The Mercury-Atlas 3
(MA-3) mission was accomplished on April
25, 1961, from the Cape Canaveral test site.
The planned flight, which was intended to orbit
an unmanned production spacecraft once
around the earth, was terminated about 40 sec-
onds after lift-off by range-safety action when
the launch vehicle failed to roll and pitch over
into the flight azimuth. The spacecraft was
aborted successfully as the result of the com-
mand signal and was quickly recovered. The
spacecraft came through the abort maneuver
with only minor damages. The performance
of all spacecraft systems was generally satis-
factory throughout the short flight. The space-
craft used on this mission was the eighth pro-
duction unit. The launch vehicle, Atlas 100-1),
had increased skin thickness in the forward end
of the lox tank and had the abort sensing and
implementation system installed for closed-loop
operation. Analysis of records indicated that
there was an electrical fault in the launch
vehicle autopilot. Subsequent action resulted in
closer examination of electrical components and
connections.
L_ttle Joe 5B.---The Little Joe 5B vehicle
was launched on April 28, 1961, from the Wal-
lops Station launch site. The vehicle was com-
posed of Mercury production spacecraft 14A
and the seventh Little Joe launch vehicle to be
flown. The spacecraft, which had previously
been used for the Little Joe 5A mission, had
been refurbished with only those systems in-
stalled that were required for the mission.
There was no landing bag and certain other
nonessentialsystemsweremissing. It wasthe
first spacecrafttobeflight-testedwithmodified
spacecraft-adapterclamp-ring limit-switch
mountingsand fairings. Also,the sequential
systemwas modifiedto prevent the limit
switchesonthespacecraft-launch-vehicleclamp
ring or thespacecraft-escape-towerclampring
from closingany circuitswhichwouldignite
the escaperocketuntil the band separation
boltswerefired. Thesechangesin andaround
the spacecraft-launch-vehicleint rfaceandin
the sequentialsystemweremadeasthe result
of the problemsencounteredin missionsLit-
tle Joe5 and Little Joe 5A. Becauseof a
severechangein flight path asthe result of
the delayedignition of oneof the two main
launch-vehiclerocketmotors,thetestwasmade
at substantiallymoresevereflight conditions
than planned. The abortwasplannedto be
initiatedat a dynamicpressureof 990lb/sq
ft; insteadthedynamicpressurehad attained
avalueof about1,920lb/sq ft whentheabort
wasinitiated. Itowever,thespacecraftescape
systemworkedasplannedand this test suc-
cessfullydemonstratedthestructuralintegrity
of the Mercury spacecraft.The spacecraft
landedin the oceanafter about5 minutesof
flight andwasrecoveredandreturnedto the
launchsitein lessthan30minutesafterlaunch.
Analysesof the flight dataand inspectionof
the spacecraftafter the missionshowedthe
spacecrafttobein goodcondition.Ananomaly
that showedup wasthe failure of twoof the
smallspacecraftumbilicalsto eject. Evidence
indicatedthat theseumbilicalsfailed to eject
becauseof interferencewith the clamp-ring
fairing after its release.This conditionwas
correctedbychangingthemannerin whichthe
fairingwassupportedonsubsequentspacecraft.
All testobjectiveswereconsideredto havebeen
met.
Mercury-Redstone 3.--The Mercury-Red-
stone 3 (MR-3) mission, the first manned space
flight by the United States, was successfully ac-
complished on May 5, 1961, from the Cape
Canaveral launch site. Astronaut Alan B.
Shepard was the pilot. The space vehicle was
composed of production spacecraft 7 and a
Mercury-Redstone launch vehicle, which was
essentially identical to the one used for the MR-
BD launch-vehicle qualification mission. Anal-
yses of the results of the mission showed that
Astronaut Shepard satisfactorily performed his
assigned tasks during all phases of the flight.
Likewise, launch vehicle and spacecraft sys-
tems performed as planned. The spacecraft
achieved an altitude of about 101 nautical miles
and was in weightless flight for slightly over 5
minutes. Postflight examination of Astronaut
Shepard and inspection of the spacecraft
showed both to be in excellent condition. A
helicopter pickup was made of the spacecraft
after the pilot had made his egress from the
side hatch of the spacecraft and had been
hoisted aboard the helicopter. The pilot and
the spacecraft were landed aboard an aircraft
carrier 11 minutes after spacecraft landing, and
the spacecraft was brought back to the launch-
ing site the morning after the flight.
Mercury-Redstone 4.--The Mercury-Red-
stone 4 (MR--4) flight was successfully made on
July 21, 1961, from the Cape Canaveral launch
site. Astronaut Virgil I. Grissom was the pilot.
The space vehicle was made up of the llth
production spacecraft and a Mercury-Redstone
launch vehicle essentially identical to the one
used for MR-3 mission. The spacecraft on this
mission was somewhat different from spacecraft
7, in that, for the first time, a manned spacecraft
had a large top window, a side hatch to be
opened by an explosive charge, and a modified
instrument panel. The spacecraft achieved a
maximum altitude of about 103 nautical miles,
with a period of weightlessness of about 5
minutes. The flight was successful. After
landing, premature and unexplained actuation
of the spacecraft explosive side hatch resulted
in an emergency situation in which the space-
craft was lost but the pilot was rescued from
the surface of the water. Analyses of the data
from the flight and debriefing by the astronaut
indicated that, in general, the spacecraft sys-
tems performed as planned, except for the action
of the spacecraft hatch. An intensive investiga-
tion of the hatch actuation resulted in a change
in operational procedures. No fault was found
in the explosive device.
Mercury-Atlas 4.--The Mercury-Atlas 4
(MA-4) vehicle was launched on September 13,
1961, from the Cape Canaveral launch site; it
was a repeat of the MA-3 test and became the
first Mercury spacecraft to be successfully in-
serted into orbit, returned, and recovered. Fur-
ther objectives of this flight were to evaluate the
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Mercury network and recovery operations con-
cerned with orbital flight. The space vehicle for
this flight was made up of Mercury-Atlas
launch vehicle 88-D, with the same modifica-
tions as the launch vehicle used on the M_A-3
mission, and the spacecraft which was used on
the MA-3 mission. The spacecraft had been re-
furbished and designated 8A for this mission.
This was a very complete spacecraft which in-
cluded a man-simulator onboard to provide a
load on the environment control system during
orbital flight. Other differences between this
spacecraft and spacecraft flown on subsequent
missions were:
(1) The landing bag was not installed
(2) The spacecraft had small viewing win-
dows rather than the large overhead window
used on later spacecraft
(3) The spacecraft entrance hatch did not
have the explosive-opening feature
(4) The instrument panel had a slightly dif-
ferent arrangement.
The launch vehicle provided the desired
orbital path with a perigee of 85.9 nautical
miles and an apogee of 123.3 nautical miles.
The planned retromaneuver over the coast of
California resulted in a landing in the Atlantic
Ocean approximately 160 nautical miles east of
Bermuda in the primary landing area. The
spacecraft was recovered in excellent condition
1 hour and 22 minutes after landing. The mis-
sion achieved the :desired objectives, even
though certain anomalies showed up in sys-
tems behavior during _he mission. None of the
anomalies had serious consequence. The anom-
alies and action taken are as follows :
(1) A spacecraft inverter failed during the
powered phases of flight. The cause was de-
termined to be a vibration-sensitive component
and found to be preventable by more precise and
exacting acceptance tests.
(2) Some anomalies in the spacecraft scanner
signals were detected during the mission. Steps
were taken to modify the system to make it less
sensitive to the effects of cold cloud layers.
(3) A leak developed in the spacecraft
oxygen-supply system during the exit phase of
the flight. The leak was small, and sufficient
oxygen was available for the mission. Post-
flight analyses determined that the leak was
caused by failure _n a pressure reducer. The
fault was corrected for subsequent missions.
(4) Some thrusters in the spacecraft automa-
tic attitude control system had either reduced
output or no output during the latter part of
the orbit. Postflight analyses indicated that
possibly the trouble was contamination of the
metering orifices in some thruster assemblies.
Mercury-Atlas 5.--The Mercury-Atlas 5
(MA-5) mission was successfully made on No-
vember 29, 1961, from the Cape Canaveral
launch site. A chimpanzee was the passenger
on this flight. The mission was planned for
three orbital passes and was to be the last quali-
fication flight of the Mercury spacecraft and
launch vehicle prior to a manned mission. The
orbit was about as planned with perigee at 86.5
nautical miles and apogee at 128.0 nautical
miles. Further objectives of this flight were to
evaluate the Mercury network and recovery op-
erations. In general, the spacecraft, launch-
vehicle, and network systems functioned well
during the mission until midway through the
second pass when abnormal performance of the
spacecraft attitude control system was detected
and verified. This malfunction precluded the
probably successful completion of the third pass
because of the high rate of control fuel con-
sumption. Accordingly, a retrofire command
was transmitted to the spacecraft which re-
sulted in it landing in the selected area at the
end of the second pass. Recovery was completed
1 hour and 15 minutes after landing. The chim-
panzee performed his assigned tasks without
experiencing any deleterious effects during the
mission and was recovered in excellent condi-
tion.
The primary anomaly during the mission was
the control-system trouble which gave rise to
increased fuel consumption by the attitude con-
trol system and which precipitated the abort of
the mission at the end of the second orbital pass.
The trouble was found to be a stopped-up meter-
ing orifice in one of the low-roll thrusters. Cor-
rective action applied to subsequent missions in-
cluded closer examinations for contamination
in this system.
The spacecraft used for this mission was pro-
duction spacecraft 9; and since it was the last
qualification vehicle prior to the first manned
orbital flight, it was intentionally made as near-
ly like the spacecraft for the manned mission
as possible. This spacecraft included the large
viewing window over the astronaut's head posi-
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tion, the landing bag, a positive lock on the
emergency-oxygen rate handle, an explosive-
release type hatch, new provisions for cooling
the inverters, and ratc gyros modified to insure
satisfactory operation in the vacuum condition.
The launch vehicle, Atlas 93-D, was much like
those launch vehicles used on the previous two
Mercury-Atlas missions; however, some addi-
tional modifications were included on this
vehicle. These modifications included a new
lightweight telemetry system and a redundant
path for the sustaine-' engine cut-off signal.
MercuryLA tlas 6.--Mercury-Atlas 6 (MA-6),
the first manned orbital space flight made from
the United States, was successfully made on
February 20, 1962, from the Cape Canaveral
test site. Astronaut John H. Glenn, Jr., was
the pilot. The flight was planned for three
orbital passes to evaluate the performance of
the manned spacecraft systems and to evaluate
the effects of space flight on the astronaut and
to obtain the astronaut's evaluation of the oper-
ational suitability of his spacecraft and sup-
porting systems. All mission objectives for
this flight were accomplished. The astronaut's
performance during all phases of the mission
was excellent, and no deleterious effects of
weightlessness were noted. In general, the
spacecraft, launch vehicle, and network system
functioned well during the mission. The main
anomaly in spacecraft operation was the loss
of thrust of two of the 1-pound thrusters which
required the astronaut to control the spacecraft
for a large part of the mission manually. The
orbit was approximately as planned, with peri-
gee at 86.9 nautical miles and apogee at 140.9
nautical miles. During the second and third
passes, a false indication from a sensor indi-
cated that the spacecraft heat shield might be
unlocked. This indication caused considerable
concern and real-time analyses resulted in the
recommendation that the expended retropack-
age be retained on the spacecraft during reentry
at the end of the third pass to hold the heat
shield in place in the event it was unlatched.
The presence of the retropackage during re-
entry had no detrimental effect on the motions
of the spacecraft. Network operation, includ-
ing telemetry reception, radar tracking, com-
munications, command control, and computing,
were excellent and permitted effective flight
control during the mission. The spacecraft for
this mission was production unit number 13
which was essentially the same as spacecraft
9 used in the MA-5 mission except for those
differences required to accommodate the pilot,
such as the couch, a personal equipment con-
tainer, filters for the window, and some minor
instrumentation and equipment modifications.
The launch vehicle was Atlas 109-D. It dif-
fered from the MA-5 launch vehicle in only
one major respect. For this launch vehicle, the
insulation and its retaining bulkhead between
the lox and fuel tank dome was removed when
it was discovered that fuel had leaked into this
insulation prior to launch. The spacecraft
landed in the planned recovery area, close to
one of the recovery ships. The spacecraft, with
the astronaut inside, was recovered approxi-
mately 17 minutes after landing. The .astro-
naut was in excellent shape.
Action to prevent recurrence of the anoma-
lies encountered during the MA-6 mission in-
cluded relocation of metering orifices and a
change in screen material in the attitude control
system thruster assemblies. Improved specifi-
cations, tighter quality control, and more con-
servative switch rigging and wiring procedures
were applied to the sensors that indicated heat-
shield release.
Mercury-Atlas 7.--The Mercury-Atlas 7
(MA-7) vehicle was launched on May 24, 1962,
from the Cape Canaveral launch site. Astro-
naut M, Scott Carpenter was the pilot for this
mission. The mission was planned for three
orbital passes and was a continuation of the
program to acquire additional operational ex-
perience and information for manned orbital
space flight. All objectives of the mission were
achieved. The spacecraft used for this flight
was production unit number 18 which was very
similar to the spacecraft 13 used on the MA-6
flight. Some of the more significant features
and modifications applied to this spacecraft in-
clude: the SOFAR bomb and radar chaff were
deleted, the earth-path and oxygen partial pres-
sure indicators were deleted, the instrument ob-
server camera was removed, provisions for a
number of experiments and evaluation were
added, a more complete temperature survey
system was added, the astronaut's suit circuit
constant-bleed orifice was deleted, the landing-
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bag limit (heat-shieldrelease)switcheswere
rewiredto preventerroneoustelemetrysignals
shouldoneswitchmalfunction.
The launchvehicle,the Atlas 107-D,was
similarto thepreviousAtlas launchvehicleex-
ceptfor afewminorchanges,thema_oroneof
whichwasthat for this mission,thefuel tank
insulation bulkheadwas retained. Launch-
vehicleperformancewassatisfactory.A peri-
geeof 86.8nauticalmilesandanapogeeof 145
nautical miles were the orbital parameters.
Duringmostof theflight,thespacecraft-system
operationwassatisfactoryuntil, late in the
third pass,thepilot notedthat thespacecraft
true attitudeand indicatedattitude in pitch
were in disagreement.Becausethis control
systemproblemwasdetectedjust beforeret-
rofire,nocorrectiveactionwaspossibleandthe
astronautwasforcedto providemanualattitude
control,usingthe windowandhorizonasthe
attitudereference,for the retrofiremaneuver.
Retrofireoccurredabout3secondslate,andthe
optimumspacecraftattitudeswerenot main-
tainedduringretrofire. As aresult,thespace-
craft landedseveralhundredmilesdownrange
of theplannedlandingpoint. Becauseof this,
recoveryof theastronautwasnotaccomplished
until about3hoursafter landing. Thespace-
craft wasretrievedlater by a destroyerafter
about6hoursin thewater. Exactcauseof the
controlsystemmalfunctionwasnotdetermined
becausethescannercircuitrysuspectedof caus-
ing the anomalywas lost whenthe antenna
sectionwasjettisonedduringthelandingphase.
Changesin checkoutproceduresusedin launch
preparationswereincorporatedto preventre-
currenceof this typeof problem.
Mercury-Atlas 8.--The Mercury-Atlas 8
(MA-8) vehicle was launched from the Cape
Canaveral launch site on October 3,1962; Astro-
naut Walter M. Schirra, Jr., was the pilot.. The
MA-8 mission was planned for six orbital
passes in order to acquire additional operational
experience and human and systems performance
information for extended manned orbital space
flight. The objectives of the mission were suc-
cessfully accomplished. The orbital parameters
were as follows: perigee, 86.9 nautical miles;
and apogee, 152.8 nautical miles. The space
vehicle for this mission consisted of produc-
tion spacecraft 16 and Atlas launch vehicle
l13-D. The spacecraft was basically the same
as spacecraft 18 utilized on the previous mis-
sion; however, a number of changes were made
in the configuration to increase reliability, to
save weight, to provide for experiments, and to
conduct systems evaluations. The launch ve_hi-
cle also had some changes as compared with the
previous Mercury-Atlas launch vehicle. These
changes include the following : the fuel tank in-
sulation bulkhead was removed at the factory
to be similar to the launch vehicle for the MA.-6
mission, the two booster engine thrust cham-
bers had baffled ejectors installed for improved
combustion characteristics, and no holddown
delay was programed between engine start and
beginning of release sequence.
The pilot performed numerous experiments,
observations, and systems evaluations during his
mission. For the first time, extended periods
of drifting flight were accomplished. Pilot ad-
herence to the flight plan was excellent. Basic
spacecraft systems, launch-vehicle systems, and
ground-network systems performed well with
only a few minor anomalies. The landing was
made in the Pacific Ocean within sight of the
primary recovery ship, and the spacecraft and
pilot were recovered in about 40 minutes.
Mercury-Atla._ 9.--The Mercury-Atlas 9
(MA-9) mission utilizing production space-
craft 20 and Atlas launch vehicle 130-D, was
successfully accomplished on May 15 and 16,
1963, with Astronaut L. Gordon Cooper as the
pilot. It was launched from the Cape Canaw-
eral test site for a planned 22 orbital-pass mis-
sion. Launch-vehicle performance was excel-
lent and a near perfect orbit was attained. The
orbital parameters were as follows: perigee,
87.2 nautical miles; apogee, 144.2 nautical miles.
For the first 18 orbital passes, the spacecraft
systems performed as expected, and the pilot
was able to adhere to the flight plan and perform
his activities as planned. Up to that time,
anomalies were limited to small nuisance-type
problems. Beginning with the 19th orbital
pass, the spacecraft systems problems began
with actuation of the 0.05g warning light. In-
vestigation of the occurrence of this warning
light indicated that the automatic control sys-
tem had become latched into _he mode required
for the reentry phase. Later, the alternating-
current power supply for the control system
failed to operate. These failures were analyzed
by the pilot and the ground crew in real time
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and i t  was determined that the pilot would 
have to make a manual retrofire and reentry. 
He performed these meneuvers with close pm- 
cision and landed a short distance from the 
prime recovery ship in the Pacific. The pilot 
and the spacecraft were recovered and hoisted 
aboard the carrier only 40 minutes after land- 
ing. More detailed results of this mission are 
contained in other papers in this document. 
Lift-off photographs of the three types of 
Mercury space vehicles are shown in figure 1-4. 
PERFORMANCE 
An examination of the history of the major 
flight tests, presented in figure 1-3, will show 
that the basic objectives of the Mercury Project 
were achieved 3v3 years after official project 
approval, with the completion of Astronaut 
John Glenn’s successful orbital flight on Febru- 
ary 20, 1962. Subsequently, Astronaut Car- 
penter completed a similar mission. Then., As- 
tronauts Schirra and Cooper completed orbital 
missions of increased duration to provide addi- 
tional information about man’s performance 
capabilities and functional characteristics in the 
space environment. I n  addition, increasing 
numbers of special experiments, observations, 
and evaluations performed during these mis- 
sions by the pilots as their capabilities were 
utilized have provided our scientific and tech- 
nical communities with much new information. 
It is emphasized that goals beyond those orig- 
inally established were achieved in a period of 
4% years after the beginning of the project 
with complete pilot safety and without change 
to the basic concepts that were used to establish 
the feasibility of the Mercury Project. 
I n  early 1959, immediately after project go- 
ahead, the first manned orbital flight was sched- 
uled to occur as early as April 1960, or 22 
months before the event actually took place 
(see fig. 1-5). This difference was caused by 
an accumulation of events which included de- 
lays in production spacecraft deliveries, diffi- 
culties experienced in the preparations for 
flight, and by the effects of the problem areas 
that were detected during the development and 
early qualification flight tests. The primary 
problem areas included those which were asso- 
ciated with the spacecraft-launch-vehicle struc- 
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FIGURE 1-5.---Co_npari_on of p ,l_n, ned and actual flight schedules.
tural interface on the MA-1 mission, spacecraft
sequential-system sensors on Little Joe missions
5 and 5A, launch-vehicle umbilical-release se-
quence on the MR-1 mission, launch-vehicle
propulsion system on MR-2, and launch-vehicle
control system on MA-3.
The applicability of these statements can be
illustrated by reference line representations of
the planned and actual schedules that are com-
pared in figure 1-5. This comparison shows
that the flight-test program was intiated about
1 month late. Missions through the develop-
ment phase and those missions accomplished
through most of the qualification phase were
accomplished at about the planned rates. The
major deviations occurred in 1960 when pro-
duction spacecraft deliveries were later and
when launch preparation took longer than
planned. The planned schedu]e allowed for
about a 4-week prelaunch preparation period
at the launch site. Actual preparation time
averaged about six times the estimated amount.
Some of the additional required preparation
time was compensated for by concurrent prepa-
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ration of several spacecraft. Also, some sig-
nificant problems were encountered during the
early qualification missions which caused de-
lays in the schedule by l'eqairing a(hlil ional mis-
sions to accomi)lish the objectives. These delays
were accumulative and were not reduced during
the life of the project. The delays that occurred
later in the project resnlted from deliberate
efforts to insure that the prep:lration for the
manned flights was complete and accurate and,
still later, from changes made to increase the
spacecraft capabilities.
Figure 1-,3 shows that 25 flight tests were
made in the 45-month period between the first
mission and the end of the project, for an aver-
age of about one flight test in each 2-month
period. This is a very rapid pace when the de-
velopment and qualification nature of the pro-
gram is considered. Even so, the average rate
was low when compared with the rate that was
maintained during the last part of 1960 and the
early part of 1961 when five spacecraft were in
preparation at once and the launchings occurred
more frequently than once a month. It should
also be noted that, during the period of high
launch rate, preparations were accomplished at
two widely separated sites, Cape Canaveral,
Fla., and Wallops Station, Va.
While the flight missions were the significant
outward signs of the project activity that re-
sulted from the total effort, it was the behind-
the-scenes activities that made the missions pos-
sible. The contents of figure 1-6 show the con-
current, aeti_;ity that existed in a number of the
more si_lificant areas of Project Mercury in
order to reduce the time required to accomplish
the objectives. The specific requirements in
many areas were dependent upon the develop-
ment being accomplished in the other areas.
Thns, there was a continual iteration process
carried on which resulted in a gradual refine-
ment of requirements and completion of the
work.
Management
Modes of Operation
Development of the management structure
and operating mode to direct this complex and
rapidly moving project began concurrently with
the approval of the plans for a program of re-
search and development leading to manned
space flight which were presented to Dr. T.
Keith Glennan, the first Administ_'ator of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA) on October 7, 1958. The plans
approved by Dr. Glennan on that date had been
formulated by a joint National Advisory Com-
mit.tee for Aeronautics-Advanced Researet_
Project Agency (NACA-ARPA) Committee,
chaired by Dr. Robert. R. Gilruth, at that time
Assistant Director of Langley Research Center.
The committee had been established during the
summer of 1'958 to outline a manned satellite
program. With the approval of these plans by
the Administrator of NASA, formerly the
NACA, Dr. Gilrnth was authorized to proceed
with the accomplishment of the Manned Space
Flight Project.
The Space Task Group (STG), later to be-
come the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)
was informally organized after this assignment
to initiate action for the project accomplish-
ment. The initial staff was comprised of 35
personnel from the Langley Research Center
and 3 from the Lewis Research Center.
On November 5, 1958, the STG located at the
Langley Research Center was formally estab-
lished and reported directly to NASA Head-
quarters in Washington, D.C. At the same
time, Dr. Gilruth was appointed head of the
STG and project manager of the manned satel-
lite program. By the end of November 1958
the manned satellite program was officially
named Project Mercury.
The overall management of the program was
the responsibility of NASA Headquarters, with
project management the responsibility of the
STG. It was recognized from the beginning
that this had to be a joint effort of all concerned,
and as such, the best knowledge and experience
as related to all phases of the program and the
cooperation of all personnel was required if suc-
cess was to be achieved. It was also recognized
that it was an extremely complex program that
would probably involve more elements of gov-
ernment and industry than any development
program before undertaken. Because of this
complexity and involvement of so many ele-
ments, management was faced with an ex-
tremely challenging task of establishing an
overall operating plan that would best fit the
program and permit accomplishment of all ob-
jectives at the earliest possible date. To achieve
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Fiev_z 1-6.--Areas of primary activityduring Project Mercury.
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this task a general working arrangement was
established as shown in figure 1-7. This figure
illustrates in a very simplified format, the gen-
eral plan used.
The arrangement was basically comprised of
three working levels. The first level established
the overall goals and objectives as well as the
basic ground rules and the means for their ac-
complishment. The next level was responsible
for establishing technical requirements and
exercising detailed management. The detailed
management was performed at this level and
provided the approval and authorizing inter-
face with all elements supporting the project.
The bond of mutual purpose established here
provided the direction and force necessary to
carry the project forward. This same bond was
evident in the groups or teams, in the third level
of effort, set up to carry out the detailed imple-
mentation and, where necessary, further define
the requirements. This level consisted of teams
comprised of personnel from all necessary ele-
ments with responsibility for the assigned task
and most knowledgeable in the area for which
the group was responsible. These third level
teams were established as required to investi-
gate and define detailed technical requirements
and insofar as possible to make the arrange-
ments to implement their accomplishment. The
team continued to function until all details of
a particular technical requirement were worked
out to the satisfaction of those concerned. As
the tasks assigned to a particular team were
completed, that team was phased out. New
teams were established to meet new require-
ments which evolved and requirements of var-
ious phases as the project progressed.
An example of this working arrangement
with a general explanation'of how it worked is
shown in figure 1-8. This example shows the
arrangement used to procure and develop the
Atlas launch vehicle for manned flight. To ac-
complish this, procurement agreements and
overall policy were established between the U.S.
Level I
Organization A
Overall
management
Functional relationship
I
I
II' 1Policy
Organization B
Overall
management
Level I
Level 2
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FIGURE1-7.--Typical management arrangement.
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Air Force Ballistic Missile Division of the De-
partment of Defense and the NASA Head-
quarters. Working within the framework of
these agreements the Atlas Weapons Systems
Command of the U.S. Air Force and the
NASA STG formulated the basic technical re-
quirements necessary to adapt the Atlas for use
in the program. Working teams consisting of
specialists from the STG and the Atlas Weap-
ons Systems Conunand were established to de-
fine the detail requirements and initiate the
necessary action for their implementation. This
implementation could be direct for cases in
which the team had the authority or the rec-
ommendation for implementation could be for-
warded to the necessary level of authority. In
any case, the next higher level could alter the
decisions of the lower level if developments
required. This arrangement also provided a
"closed-loop" management structure, thus as-
suring positive means of communication and
proper technical directions. Frequently, spe-
cialists from the contractors and other support-
ing elements were included in the teams to
assemble the best available talent to solve the
problem. Quite often, tasks involving consid-
erable effort were assigned directly to individ-
ual team members by the chairman of the group
for implementation.
The same general arrangement was employed
between NASA elements in accomplishing
major tasks, such as establishing the World-
wide Tracking Network, as illustrated in figure
1-9. In addition to the many overall arrange-
ments that had to be made in establishing the
Worldwide Tracking Network, such as agree-
ments with foreign governments, working
through the State Department, regarding the
location and operation of ground stations in
their territory, the task of providing the hard-
ware and facilities that made up the ground
stations represented a major task that was pri-
marily the responsibility of the STG and the
Langley Research Center. This example covers
the means by which the basic technical require-
ments and hardware needs of the ground sta-
tions were accomplished through the combined
efforts of the STG and Langley. The Langley
Research Center was responsible for the pro-
curement and establishment of the network,
with the basic flight monitoring and control re-
quirements being the responsibility of the STG.
The overall agreements regarding the imple-
mentation of this effort were established at the
Director-Project Manager level with the basic
technical requirements being defined at the level
of the cognizant divisions. After the basic re-
quirements were presented to the Langley Re-
Ballistic Procure ment NASA
Missile and policies Headquarters
Oivison
Supporting
elements:
other Air Force
division
and contractors
Supporting
elements:
other NASA
centers and
cent re ctors
FmuRm 1-8.--Management arrangement used to procure, develop, and prepare the Atlas launch vehicle for
manned flight.
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searchCenter,teamswereestablishedtodiscuss
andresolvethedetailtechnicalrequirementsof
the network. For example,a teamwasas-
signedthe task of establishing the communica-
tions and tracking requirements and resolving
the type of equipment to be used on the space-
craft and the detail design characteristics of
this equipment. They then had to determine if
suitable receiving equipment for tile ground
stations was available or if it had to be de-
veloped. This involved coordinating overall
requirements given to both the Langley Re-
search Center's ground station contractors and
the STG's spacecraft contractor to determine if
the desired requirement could be achieved and
if not, to determine an acceptable means of
achieving the desired results. This points out
only one detail area that this kind of group had
to resolve; other areas such as location of the
ground stations, frequencies of transmission,
bandwidths, spacecraft antemm radiation pat-
terns, and so on presented the same type of prob-
lems that had to be resolved. These efforts
evolved into the Mercury Worldwide Tracking
Network, the operation of which was the re-
sponsibility of the Goddard Space Flight Cen-
ter (GSFC). Similar arrangements existed
between the many elements necessary to de-
velop the network and implement its operation.
To illustrate further this type working ar-
rangement the identifications on figure 1-7
could be changed to represent those of the STG
and the spacecraft contractor, McDonnell Air-
craft Corporation (MAC). In this instance it
was recognized by both parties that normal con-
tractual procedures alone were insufficient to
achieve the desired results within the scheduled
time frame. Direct communication regarding
technical requirements between the specialists
of STG and MAC had to be the rule rather
than the exception. Management agreements
on the upper levels provided the framework
whereby this could be accomplished and pro-
vided the management decisions for project di-
rection. Frequently, the teams determined a
course of action and proceeded without further
delay, with verification documentation fol-
lowing through regular channels. The "closed-
loop" built into the working arrangement
provided the assurance that contractual and
program requirements were met in all cases.
Regular management reviews of hardware
status and task achievement kept management
al)reast of the problem areas and afforded the
opportunity for timely direction of effort to
many specific problem areas. This mode of op-
eration enhanced the rapidity with which a de-
sign change could be implemented or a course of
action altered. This contributed to the timely
conclusion of a project.
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Fmtms 1-9.--Management arrangement used to establish the ground tracking organization.
The foregoing discussion is primarily con-
cerned with the management techniques that
existed with the external organizations, but the
same type of procedure was commonly used
within the organizational structure of the STG.
As firm definition of the program emerged and
final spacecraft design details were formalized.
it became necessary to centralize the coordinat-
ing effort within the STG. To accomplish this,
centralized review meetings were condticted on
a regular basis to correlate all elements of the
effort and ascertain that unified approaches and
directions were maintained. These meetings
were attended by cognizant personnel from
within the STG and by personnel from other
activities when required. The primary func-
tion of these meetings was to obtain the best in-
puts available for the technical management of
the project and to control the engineering and
design and thereby the configuration of the
spacecraft. Information channeled into these
meetings was dispersed directly to the responsi-
ble individuals within the STG, with assign-
ments being made directly to the cognizant
organization when action was required. Tech-
nical direction required as a result of action ini-
tiated at the coordination meetings, after thor-
ough review as to need, .cost, and effect on
schedule, was issued to' the applicable contrac-
tors. Meetings of this type provided fast re-
sponse and accurate direction throughout the
duration of the project. As the staff and pro-
ject responsibilities increased, the support ad-
ministrative functions performed by the Lang-
ley Research Center, such as Personnel, Pro-
curement and Supply, and Budget and Finance
Offices, were incorpo_ ated into the STG manage-
ment organization.
The formation of the Mercury Field Opera-
tions Organization at Cape Canaveral marked
the entry of Project Mercury into the opera-
tional phase of the program. In conjunction
with this an Operations Director wasappointed
with complete responsibility and authority for
flight preparation and mission operations. The
Operations Director also served as the single
point of contact for Department of Defense
(DOD) activities supporting Project Mercury.
Although the general management modes of
operation previously discussed were applied
throughout the duration of the project, a dif-
ferent type functional organization was estab-
lished for the specific purpose of conducting a
space-flight mission. The organization cover-
ing the flight operations phase of the project
was a line organization with elements from the
government and contractor organizations in-
volved in the operation reporting directly to the
Operations Director. Figure 1-10 illustrates
the manner in which these elements merged to
form this functional line organization.
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NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center
I
Director
Air Force Space "i-
Systems Division
I ,
i LtTest ConductorGeneral Dynamics
/Astr6nautics
l
Launch Vehicle
Systems
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Launch I
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NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center
Launch Vehicle J
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Aerospace
Spacecraft
Test Conductor
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Spacecraft Center
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Director J
NASA Manned J
Spacecraft Center J
J Flight
Controllers J
NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center
I
Spacecraft
Systems
Mc Donnell
Aircraft Carp
I
Aeromedical and Spac d
croft Instrumentation J
NASA Manned J
Spacecraft Center l
FX0URE 1-10.--Integrated functional organization for
launch operations.
An organizational chart of this nature fails to
show the unified effort, the cooperation, and the
team work that was evident in every Mercury
flight. All elements of governnaent and in-
dustry supporting the project pulled together
toward a common goal, with each individual
striving to do his best. Without this spirit of
cooperation and team work, the degree of suc-
cess experienced in Project Mercury would not
have been possible.
The success of Project Mercury demonstrated
not only the reliability of the equipment but
also the effectiveness of the management organi-
zation and the working arrangements with the
various supporting elements throughout govern-
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mentandindustry. Effortsto assurethatProj-
ectMercurywouldmeetits objectivesevolved
in the highlevelagreementsthat resultedin
clearlinesof authorityand responsibilityfor
technicaldirection.
With theincreasingnationaleffortinthefield
of spacexploration,additionalmannedspace
projectswereassignedtotheSTG. Becauseof
theincreasedemphasisandscopeof themanned
spaceflighteffort,the MSCwasestablishedin
November1961from thenucleusprovidedby
theSTG. SoonaftertheMSCwasestablished,
theMercuryProjectOfficewascreatedandas-
signedtheresponsibilityandauthorityfor de-
tailed managementand technicaldirectionof
theproject,workingwith thesupportof other
MSCunitsin areasin whichtheyhad cogni-
zanceor had specificspecialtiesneededto
achieveprojectobjectives.TheMSCorganiza-
tionexistingattheendoftheprojectisshownin
figure1-11. The MercuryProjectOfficepro-
videdtheprojectmanagementtotheconclusion
of the project and usedthe samegeneral
managementmethodestablishedearly in the
program.
Tools
A_ reporting system was required by manage-
ment to control the fast-moving project so that
effective and timely decisions could be made.
Various methods used by management to ac-
complish this included reports, schedules, cost
control, and later, pr%oTam evaluation and re-
view technique (PERT) in addition to the tech-
nical reviews previously mentioned.
Many types of technical reports were pre-
pared for management in order to keep it
abreast of progress and problems. These re-
ports were concise and factual status reports
issued daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly
to highlight progress or lack of progress with-
out conjecture. Obviously, close to the launch
date, the daily reports became the most impor-
tant. Another valuable report was the one pre-
pared .after the completion of each mission.
These were prepared expeditiously to present
analyses of the performance of all the systems
involved in the mission, from the lowest ele-
ments through operational recovery techniques.
The results of these analyses: were used imme-
diately after a mission to form the basis for
corrective action that often influenced the hard-
ware on the very next mission. These results
were issued in formal report formats that con-
rained detailed descriptions of the mission and
equipment, performance analyses, result of in-
vestigations of anolnalies, and much of the data.
The reporting effort became greater as the
complexity and duration of the missions in-
creased, and larger reports and longer prepara-
tion times resulted. However, in most cases, the
reports were printed for distribution within 30
days after the mission. The report of the
MA-9 mission, for example, contained more
than 1,000 pages of information.
Innumerable documents were generated cov-
ering all aspects of the program during the life
of Project Mercury so that management as well
as the individual elements could have overall
knowledge of project details and progress.
These documents were prepared by all elements
participating in the program and included such
general types as drawings, familiarization man-
uals, specifications, operational procedures, test
procedures, qualification status, test results, mis-
sion results, reports on knowledge gained and
status reports of all kinds. It is estimated that
at least 30 formal documents, excluding draw-
ings, engineering change orders, and so forth,
were issued during the course of the project.
A partial listing of the types of documentation
used during the program is included in appen-
dix A.
Overall schedule control was accomplished by
the use of a Master Working Schedule which
indicated major milestones, such as spacecraft
deliveries and checkout periods, launch-vehicle
deliveries and checkout times, launch-complex
cleanup and conversion, and tracking network
status. Detailed bar-chart schedules were main-
tained in areas of direct concern, such as indi-
vidual spacecraft at the manufacturer's plant,
launch preparation of the spacecraft and
launch vehicle at the launch site, astronaut
train!ng, and the major test programs.
To control cost, management constantly moni-
tored commitments, obligations, and expendi-
tures through the normal accounting techniques.
During the later phases of the program, the
project office maintained cost control charts on
which approved programed funds were shown,
as well as obligations for a given time period.
From these charts, management could tell at a
glance the amount of remaining unobligated
funds for any given area.
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In the last year and a half, the Manned Space-
craft Center applied the PERT system to cover
all areas of the project. The PERT network
information was analyzed and updated biweek-
ly and provided useful information on a timely
basis to make it possible to employ the use of
redundant action paths or to apply additional
effort when it appeared as though problems in
a single, critical path would result in long de-
lays.
Engineering, technical, configuration, and
mission reviews were held as often as once a
week to present up-to-date information on pro-
posed technical changes, potential problem
areas, and test results. At these meetings, the
necessary decisions were made to keep the pro-
gram moving along the chosen path at the de-
sired rate. At other times, development engi-
neering inspections were held at the contractors'
plants as significant systems approached de-
livery status. These inspections were attended
by top management and the best, most experi-
enced supervisors, pilots, engineers, specialists,
inspectors, and technicians. As a result of
these inspections and thorough validating dis-
cussions, requests for mandatory corrective ac-
tion were issued.
Flight safety reviews attended by top man-
agement probably constituted the most si_fifi-
cant management tools used in Project Mercury
to insure that the proper attention had been
given to necessary details. These reviews were
held in the days immediately before hmnch.
In the process of ascertaining that the material
required for presentation at the meetings would
be acceptable, the technical work in progress
was reviewed in great detail with particular
emphasis being placed on results of tests, modi-
fications, and changes that had been incorpo-
rated and the action that was taken to correct
discrepancies. At the reviews, then, the ques-
tions relating to the flight readiness of the
spacecraft, the launch vehicle, the crew, the net-
work, the range, and the recovery effort could l)e
answered in the affirmative, except in those
cases where actual anomalies were discovered in
the test results, data, or records during the pres-
entation. Of course, these anomalies were then
completely corrected or resolved, because no
Mercury launchings were ever made in the face
of known troubles or unresolved doubts of any
magnitude that could affect mission success or
mission safety.
Resources
Many milestones occurred during the 57
months of the project as shown in figure 1-3.
Mercury history reflects 25 major fligl_t tests
in a 45-month period. It should be noted that
launch preparations and flights were accom-
plished from two widely separated sites: Cape
Canaveral, Fla., and Wallops Station, Wallops
Island, Va. Twenty-three launch vehicles were
utilized--seven Little Joe, six Mercury-Red-
stone, and ten Mercury-Atlas. Two flight tests,
the off-the-pad abort and the first Little Joe
flight test, did not utilize launch vehicles. Fif-
teen. production spacecraft were utilized for the
flights, some of which were used for more than
one flight mission or test unit. One s])acecraft
was used entirely for a ground test unit.
The broad range of effort which occurred,
often concurrently, during the life of the proj-
ect required the services of large numbers of
people, as illustrated in table 1-I. At the height
of this effort there were 11 major contractors,
75 major subcontractors, and 7,9_00 vendors
working to produce the equipment needed for
Project Mercury. Also included in this en-
deavor were the task forces from the DOD sup-
plying ships, planes, medical assistance, man-
power, and so on in support of flight and re-
covery operations. During the development
and qualification phase of the project, effort
was expended from Langley Research Center,
Lewis Research Center, George C. Marshall
Space Flight Center, Goddard Space Flight
Center, Ames Research Center, Wallops Sta-
tion, and DOD involving hundreds of people.
Colleges and universities also investigated many
different and significant facets of Project Mer-
cury. At the height of the program, there were
some 650 people working directly on Project
Mercury in the MSC and over 700 more in other
parts of the NASA. In all, it is estimated that
there were more than 2,000,000 persons located
throughout the United States who directly or
indirectly provided support for the Mercury
Program. The general locations of the major
contractors, universities, NASA centers and
other government agencies are illustrated in
figure 1-12.
24
T_ble l-/.--Peak Manpower Support
Source Approximate peak numbers
1,360NASA:
Direct ..........................................................
Research and development ........................................
Industry :
Contractors (11) .................................................
Major subcontractors (75) ............... _ ........................
Vendors (7,200) ..................................................
Department of Defense ...............................................
Educational groups ..................................................
Others ..............................................................
Total .........................................................
650
710
33, 000
150, 000
1,817, 000
2,000, 000
18, 000
168
1,000
2, 020, 528
FIGURE 1-12.--Distribution of organizations in the United States that supported the project.
Lists of government agencies, prime contrac-
tors, and major subcontractors and vendors are
presented in appendixes B, C, and D, respec-
tively. A list of NASA personnel who con-
tributed to the Mercury Project effort is pre-
sented in appendix E.
The total cost of the Mercury Program as
published i'n the Congressional Committee
Record in January 1960 was estimated to be
$344,500,000. The basic objectives were ful-
filled with the successful completion of the MA-
6 flight and additional space experience was
obtained from the MA-7, MA-8, and MA-9 mis-
sions. The latest accounting shows a total
project cost of $384,131,000; however, final
auditing has not been completed. These cost
figures include the cost of the Mercury track-
ing network which will be used for manned
space programs for years to come, and the cost
of the operational and recovery support sup-
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Table 1-II.--Cost Breakdown
Breakdown
Spacecraft :
Design .............................................
Production .........................................
Test and flight preparation ...........................
Subcontract ........................................
Qualification ........................................
Network ............................................... ,
Launch vehicles .........................................
Operations ..............................................
Supporting development ..................................
Total ............................................
Percent of total
8.6
5.6
4.2
16.2
3.0
37. 6
37. 6
32. 4
23. 7
4.3
2.0
100. 0
Cost in millions of
dollars
144. 6
33. 2
21. 7
15.9
62. 2
11.6
144. 6
124. 6
90. 9
16.4
7.6
384.1
plied for each mission. A cost breakdown is
presented in table 1-II, indicating how the
funds were used. It is shown that the largest
part of the funds went into the development of
the spacecraft and the Worldwide Tracking
Network. This is not surprising since these
items required complete development. About
24 percent was expended for various launch
vehicles. The remainder of the funds was spent
for operational expenses and for supporting re-
search and development. A breakdown of the
spacecraft costs shows that approximately equal
percentages were spent on design and on pro-
duction. Almost one-half of the total space-
craft cost was spent on subcontracts by the
spacecraft contractor.
The peak rate of expendittu_s in the pro-
gram, ;_s illustrated in figure 1-13, occurred dur-
F Y-1959 FY-1960 FY-1961 FY-i962 FY-1963
JIFIM!AIMIJ JIAIsloINIDIJLFIMIAIMIJ JtAISlOiNI0101FIMIAIMIJJ AIsloINiDIJIFIMIAIMIJ JIAIslolNIoJIFIM!AIMIJ'
I I I 1 I I I
t25 -tO0
._ 75
!oo
_5jo
I[O) Yeorly rote
420 -
300 Totol
Spacecraft I
Lounch vehicle _---- l /
O_,ro,,o_ .... I / ....
l I / I delilery ....... _-
0
(b) Totol progrom ¢ost.-curnulotive
FxovRz 1-13.--Rate of expenditures and ace ,umulated cc_t.
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ing tile fiscal year of 1.961 and can be attributed
to several factors. /)urine' this period, more
than half of tile total production sl)acecraft
were delivered and more major flight missions
were accomplished than ill any other compara-
1)le time period. Launch activities were sup-
ported both at VVallops Station, Va., and at
Cape Canaveral, Fla. Funds were being spent
on the Worldwide Tracking Network for the
coming orbital missions. The Redstone phase
of flight program was nearing completion and
the Atlas phase was approaching a peak. Also,
much astronaut training was accomplished and
the first manned ballistic flight was completed
during this period.
Technical Experience
The maior results obtained and the significant
philosophies and techniques developed during
the course of the project, are gTouped for dis-
cussion in the following areas: physiological
and psychological responses of man in the space
environment, flight and ground crew prepara-
tional procedures, and techniques and philoso-
phy for launch preparation.
Responses of Man
The manned Mercury flights produced con-
siderable information on human response and
general physiological condition. Some of the
most significant result s may be summarized as
follows :
(1) Results of repeated preflight and post-
flight physical examinations have detected no
permanent changes related to the space-flight
experience, although Astronauts Schirra and
Cooper temporarily showed indications of or-
thostatic hypotension after their missions.
(2) There have been no alarming deviations
from the normal, and the astronauts have
proved to be exceedingly capable of making
vital decisions affecting flight safety, taking
prompt accurate action to correct systems de-
ficiencies, accomplishing spacecraft control, and
completing all expected pilot functions.
(3) The weightless state for the time periods
of up to 34 hours has shown no cause for con-
cern. Food and water have 'been consumed and
the astronaut has slept. No abnormal body
sensations and functions have been reported by
the astronauts. The health of all of the astro-
nauts has been good and remains so.
Not only has it been found that man can func-
tion normally in space, at least up to a maxi-
mum of 34 hours, but it has been found that he
can be, depended upon to operate the spacecraft
and its systems whenever it is desired that he do
so. On the MA-6 and MA-7 missions, the
astronauts overcame severe automatic control
system difficulties by manually controlling their
spacecraft for retrofire and reentry. Also, on
the MA-9 mission, the performance of the astro-
naut demonstrated that man is a valuable space-
craft system 'because of his judgment, his ability
to interpret facts, and his ability to take correc-
tive action in the event of malfunctions which
would have otherwise resulted in a failure of
the mission.
The astronauts also proved that they were
qualified experimenters. As a result, the
weight allocated in each succeeding manned
orbital space flight increased from 11 pounds on
MA-6 to 6"2pounds on MA-9 for equipment not
related to mission requirements. In each of
these missions, lhe astronauts have demon-
strated their ability to perform special experi-
ments and to be a scientific observer'of items of
opportunity.
It can be concluded that the astronauts have
proved to be qualified, necessary space systems,
with flexible, wide-band-observation abilities,
and have demonstrated that they could analyze
situations, make decisions, and take action to
back up spacecraft systems when provisions
were made to give them the capability.
Crew Preparation
Studies, simulators, and training equipment
for preparing flight crews and simultaneous
participation of flight and ground crews in
simulated missions were important to the suc-
cess of the mission. This training is discussed
in detail in later papers of this document. Be-
fore the final round of training and simulation
began, it was found necessary to formulate and
freeze a well-defined, detailed flight plan. This
must be done far enough in advance of the mis-
sion to give the pilot sufficient time to trdin to
the particular plan with the ground network
teams who will support him during the mission.
It has also been found to be important to avoid
filling every available moment of the flight with
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a planned crew or ground-station activity.
Time must be available to the flight crew to
manage the spacecraft systems and to investi-
gate anomalies or nrllfunctions in the system
and to observe an¢i measure the unexpected.
Time must be provided to allow the pilot to
consider thoughtfully his reactions to the space
environmen_ and its effects upon him. He must
have time to eat and drink and to obtain suffi-
cient rest. Training in simulator devices has
proved to be a valuable tool for preparing a man
for space flight. Well in advance of his fight,
the pilot must have detailed training in the basic
systems and procedures for the mission. In
addition to preparing the pilot for normal and
emergency flight duties, the training must also
prepare him to conduct successfully the special
experiments assigned to his mission. For cer-
tain of these tasks, the pilot becomes a labora-
tory experimenter and must be suitably trained.
So far, many different training modes have been
used to good advantage. These modes include
lectures by specialists, discussions with the as-
sociated scientists, familiarization sessions with
the specialized flight equipment before the
flight, and parallel study in the field of the ex-
periment. During the project, the special
training given the astronauts produced trained
experimenters for each mission.
Launch Preparation
In the process of hardware checkout during
launch preparations, it has been found essential
to have detailed written test and validation pro-
cedures, procedures that are validated and fol-
lowed to the most minute detail during the
preliminary systems checkout and, again, during
later and final systems and integrated systems
checkouts. It is necessary for the procedures
to be so written that even small anomalies be-
come readily apparent to those persons involved
in the checkout. These persons must be so
trained and indoctrinated that they are always
watchful for anomalies which would be direct
or indirect indications that the hardware may
be approaching failure. Checkouts are not com-
pleted at the end of the detailed procedures, for
it has been found that the data accumulated
during a checkout procedure may reveal, upon
detailed analyses, further symptoms that all is
not well within a system. Finally, the Mercury
personnel have developed and adhered to a phi-
losophy that is believed to be a basic reason for
Mercury's operational success. This philosophy
is that Mercury launcbings will not take plac_ in
the face of known troubles or in the face of un-
resolved doubts of any magnitude that could
possibly affect mission success or flight safety.
It is believed that adherence to this philosophy
is of utmost importance to success of any
manned space flight program.
Areas for Improvement
A list of those general technical areas that
appeared to be either the source of, or a major
contributing factor to the problems that repeat-
edly cost the project time and money would
include design requirements, qualification prac-
tices, definition of standards, tests and valida-
tion procedures, and configuration management.
The conditions and effects described in these
• areas are not unique to this project, but repre-
sent those that generally exist in the aerospace
field. Therefore, improvements in these areas
would be beneficial in reducing the number of
discrepancies that may potentially cause sched-
ule delays and rising costs. Discussion of these
areas will reveal that in most trouble areas care-
ful and continuing attention to detail and qual-
ity assurance program were not as effective in
the aerospace industry as necesary. It is be-
lieved that the need for improvements has be-
come clear and that the changes for the space
flight era are beginning to be made.
Design Requirements
Requirements and philosophies applied dur-
ing the detail design phase have a profound and
lasting effect on the overall performance of a
project ; therefore, some of the more significant
shortcomings observed in the design phase are
emphasized. Adequate design margins must be
established and they must be adequate. An ex-
ample where inadequate margins were detri-
mental is the weight-sensitive landing system.
Experience with aircraft and spacecraft designs
shows that weight continues to increase with
time. In Mercury, this increase was significant ;
and although the rate tended to decrease with
time, it, was present throughout the duration of
the project. The orbital weight of the space-
craft increased at an average rate about 5
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pounds (0.2 percent) per week during 1959 and
1960; thereafter the increase averaged less than
2 pounds per week, even after a strong weight-
control program had been initiated. The over-
all weight increase caused an extensive requali-
fication of the landing system because the
original design did not have sufficient growth
margin. During the initial design phase care-
ful consideration should be given to the use
of redundancy. There are different forms of
redundancy and the correct form must be chosen
for the particular application to prevent de-
grading the overall reliability of the system.
Because of the hazards of space flight and the
lack of provisions for repairing or replacing
equipment in flight, it was imperative in Mer-
cury spacecraft that all critical functions have
redundant modes. The redundancy was made
less automatic, as man demonstrated the capa-
bility of applying the redundant function or
providing the redundancy himself.
In the design of a spacecraft, consideration
must be given to accessibility of components
and assemblies. More than 3,000 equipment re-
movals were made during the launch prepara-
tions on an early spacecraft; at least 1200 re-
movals were performed during preparations of
the other production spacecraft. The majority
of these removals occurred to permit, access to
a failed part. It is important that the design
be such that a minimum number of other com-
ponents have to be disturbed when it is neces-
sary to replace or revalidate a component.
Since man first began making things, partic-
ularly with machines that could produce identi-
cal copies, he has found himself in the position
where interchangeability is a combination of a
blessing and a trap. Time and time again air-
planes, automobiles, and other types of systems
have had troubles and faults, because things
that could be connected wrong have been con-
nected wrong, regardless of printed instructions,
colors, or common sense. Therefore, it is imper-
ative that electrical connectors, mechanical com-
ponents, and pneumatic and liquid connectors be
so designed that they cannot physically be as-
sembled in the wrong orientation or in the
improper order. Experience shows clearly that
this requirement cannot be overemphasized.
Mismated or misconnected parts continued
throughout the project to ruin components, give
false indications of trouble, and result in im-
proper functions that can cause test failure dur-
ing the life of the project.
In the design of equipment for specific appli-
cations, consideration must be made for the
shelf-life periods, including a margin for delays
and extensions to the schedule. Occasionally
in Mercury, these periods were not adequate and
some equipment had to be replaced because the
lifetime limit had been exceeded while still in
storage.
Still another and often overlooked considera-
tion is compatibility of materials. This may be
related to the materials themselves, to the en-
vironment, or, in the case of manned vehicles,
to the sensitivity of the man. In any event, care
must be taken to see that only those materials
properly approved for use in the vehicle are
actually used. Time and money were expended
in Mercury to rectify cases where improper ma-
terials were found in the systems because some-
one had failed to follow the approved materials
list.
Qualification Practices
Complete and appropriate qualification of
components, assemblies, subsystems, and sys-
tems is essential for reliable performance of
space equipment. In the design of the Mercury
spacecraft, allowances were made for the un-
known environment of the planned manned
space-flight missions, by conservatism in design,
by redundancy of equipment in systems, and,
most important, by component qualification
testing through ranges of environmental condi-
tions that were believed to exceed the real con-
ditions. The exact conditions that the compon-
ents and equipment would be subjected to dur-
ing Mercury space flights, of course, was un-
known prior to the time of the flights. There-
fore, care was taken in selecting the qualifica-
tion conditions because underqualification could
result in inflight failures, and drastic overquali-
fication could cause unnecessary delays and high
costs in the program. The selected qualification
conditions proved to represent the actual en-
vironment conditions very well. Some modifi-
cations to the specifications were made as the
project progressed to make allowances for spe-
cific environments, such as local heating in
equipment areas and system-induced electrical
"glitches." Complete coverage of conditions is
important, but not sufficient if the qualification
is not also appropriate. During the MA-9 mis-
29
sion,equipmentfaultsoccurredlatein themis-
sionwhichresultedin thefailure of the auto-
maticcontrolsystemand requiredAstronaut
Cooper to make his retromaneuver and reentry
manually. These faults, which occurred in the
electrical circuitry interfaces of the automatic
control system, were caused by the accumulation
of moisture. The components that suffered
these faults had passed the Mercury humidity
and moisture qualification tests; however, de-
tail investigation revealed that one inappro-
priate step had occurred. The qualifcation pro-
cedures were set up so that the equipment was
functionally validated before the test ; however,
during exposure to humid air and moisture, it
was not functionally operated because it was
not convenient to do so ill the test facility. _Vhile
it was being prepared for the posttest validation,
it was given an opportunity to do some drying.
The obvious fault was that the equipment was
not required to operate during the entire course
of the test. Of course, the weightless condition
could not be simulated in these or any other
ground tests and it is quite likely that this omis-
sion also played a role in this flight failure.
To be complete, qualification test requirements
must be selected to cover all possible normal and
contingent conditions and to allow for the inte-
grated efforts that show up when a complete sys-
tem is operated.
One way the qualification of a complete sys-
tem has been accomplished in the project is
through the use of full-scale, simulated environ-
ment tests. A spacecraft was completely out-
fitted with flight equipment and instrumented
and tested under environmental conditions to re-
produce as closely as possible the normal and
abnormal, but possible, flight conditions. From
these tests, it was possible to determine the ef-
fects of modifications and to demonstrate the
performance of the integrated system. Almost
1,000 hours of this type of testing was accom-
plished, compared with less than 60 hours of
actual space flight during the entire project.
Definition of Standards
It has become very apparent that certain
standards that have been used for years in the
aircraft industry must be revised and tightened
to make them satisfactory for application to
aerospace equipment. Among these are shop
practices; for example, those practices used in
preparing electrical wiring nmst be reevaluated
to assure that each step is accomplished in a
manner that meets high-quality standards. In-
sulat, ion stripping, soldering, crimping or weld-
ing, and cleaning processes must be accom-
plished without degrading the materials and in
such a way that the quality of the work can be
verified. Requirements must be made more
rigorous and must be thoroughly understood by
the people performing the operations, by their
supervisors, and by the inspectors to insure con-
tinuing high quality work.
Some space equipment is designed to close
tolerances which make it very sensitive to con-
tamination in any form ;.therefore, it is impera-
tive that steps be takeri to assure that proper
and consistent cleanliness standards are set up
throughout the manufacturing, assembly, vali-
dation, and checkout phases. A number of these
cleanliness standards exist at the present time.
However, what is considered clean by one stand-
ard may be dirty when compared with "clean"
by a similar appearing standard. Steps are
now being taken in the industt T to formulate
logical and consistent standards and it is neces-
sary to implement and to enforce these stand-
ards as soon as possible to prevent recurrence of
the continual difficulty caused in this project by
contamination that ruined metering orifices,
check valves, pressure regulators, relief valves,
reducers, compressors, and other mechanical
equipment, as well as electrical and electronic
equipment.
Test and Validation Procedures
Checkout, test, and verification procedures
must be compatible with one aamther and with
procedures serving the same function on sim-
ilar equipment at different test sites. Numer-
ous cases of anomalies, or suspected malfunc-
tions, and failed equipment have been traced to
improper or incompatible test procedures and
test mediums or equipment. Also, it was found
that careful attention to test techniques is essen-
tial: otherwise equipment can be damaged be-
cause commctions are made improperly or dirt
can be introduced into the equipment by the
test equipment. It has been found that test
techniques must be tightened, verified, analyzed,
and written in detail to lessen the chance for
inadvertent steps to ruin the operation or give
false assurance.
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Configuration Control
During the course of the project, consider-
able effort was expended by NASA and its con-
tractors in maintaining an accurate definition
of system configuration so that configuration
management could be properly maintained.
Much of this was manual effort that could not
respond as rapidly to changes and interroga-
tions as desired. At least 12 major documents,
some of which were updated continually, some
periodically, and some for each mission, were
used to present the necessary information which
was summarized for the desired definition.
Component identification, which is essential to
component traceability, also was often a tedious,
time-c0nsuming, and inaccurate process. To
provide for adequate configuration control, it
is important that vital information of systems,
subsystems, and components be gathered at a
central point. Then, provisions must be made
to view this information from appropriate lev-
els and directions so that accurate and respon-
sive configuration management can be accomp-
lished. Eventual incorporation of such a
system on a national scale would provide a re-
trievable file to insure maximum use of techni-
cal experience and to lessen the chance of
repeated errors.
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